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I. Introduction
The sizes and variability of punitive damage awards are topics of
substantial debate. They also appear to affect some firms’ business
decisions. The prospect of high adverse awards so concerned
cigarette manufactures that they agreed to pay over $350 billion to
limit much of their punitive exposure. Defenders of punitive awards
point out that punitive award liability was, “. . . the lever that
brought the tobacco industry to the table.”1 Opponents of large
punitive awards, however, claim that these awards impose undue
costs on prospective defendants: “To play the game, you have to bet
the corporation.”2 Supporters and opponents may not agree on many
things, but they both agree that punitive damages are important.
One reason punitive awards are potentially costly to firms is that
they appear to be both highly variable and large relative to the losses
suffered by the plaintiff. In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., compensatory damages of $52,146 were combined
with a $6 million punitive judgment. In Pacific Mutual Life v. Haslip,
compensatory damages of $200,000 prompted additional punitive
damages of $3.84 million. And in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., compensatory damages of $19,000 were boosted
with a $10 million punitive award (see Table 5 for a complete list).
                                                 
* School of Business, University of Washington.
** School of Law, University of Chicago.
1 Former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Michael Pertchuk, quoted by
Peter Passell, “The Split Over Punitive Awards in Getting the Bad Guys,” New
York Times, Thursday, July 10, 1997, p. D2.
2 Michael Horowitz, director of the Hudson Institute’s Project for Civil Justice,
ibid.
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All three of these punitive awards were upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court, but in recent decisions the Court has begun to reign
in such awards. The Court ruled that the punitive damage award in
BMW v. Gore, for example, was so excessive that it violated the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Congress also
recently has considered legislation that would place limits on
punitive damages. In 1995, for example, the House of
Representatives passed two bills that would cap punitive awards and
impose costs on parties who refused settlements and subsequently
received judgments for smaller amounts.
These efforts are based on a view that large punitive awards are
costly to defendant companies. Little is known, however, about the
importance of punitive awards for firm value, and hence, the value of
judicial or legislative limits on such awards. Anecdotes about a few
exceptionally large awards do not necessarily imply that firms in
general expect large losses when cases are filed against them. Nor do
they indicate that punitive damages impose large losses on the
market as a whole. One objective of this paper is to measure the
valuation impacts of punitive awards, the lawsuits that bring them
about, and judicial and legislative attempts to place limits on them.
We also examine the predictability of punitive damage awards.
Sunstein et. al (1997) present a theory implying that potential
punitive awards should be both unbounded and unpredictable. The
evidence about the predictability of punitive awards, however, is
mixed. Consistent with their prediction, Sunstein et. al. provide
experimental evidence supporting the notion that dollar awards
made by juries are inherently difficult to predict. Similar results using
experimental markets are reported by Kahneman, et. al. (1997).
Using data from actual practice, however, Eisenberg, et. al. (1997)
conclude that punitive damages are at least as predictable as
compensatory damages. They find that nearly 50 percent of the
cross-sectional variation in punitive damages can be explained with a
simple linear model using compensatory damages and broad
descriptions of the type of case (e.g., medical malpractice or fraud).
However, serious concern has been raised about the Eisenberg study,
as it excludes cases that have been settled and explains only the
variation in punitive damages cases where punitive damages have
been awarded (Polinsky, 1997). We address this issue by examining
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the predictability of punitive awards using data on both settlements
and verdict decisions. We also attempt to explain the variation in
punitive damages across all cases, rather than merely those in which
punitive awards are levied.
An additional concern is not just with whether punitive damages
are predictable, but whether they are predictable for the right
reasons. Landes and Posner (1987, pp. 160-5) and Polinsky and
Shavell (1997) argue that punitive damages should be used when the
probability of detection is low, so that the total penalty imposed
upon the defendant ensures that the firm internalizes the damage
imposed upon others.
 In this paper we seek to add to this theoretical debate as well.
We argue that strictly relating punitive damages to the probability of
punishment ignores the role of private contracting and reputation in
assuring contractual performance. The probability-of-detection
justification for punitive awards holds only when the costs imposed
upon the plaintiff represent an externality, or alternatively, where a
contractual relationship does not take place. One example of this
may be environmental damage, such as that imposed by the Exxon
Valdez oil spill.3 Most activities over which punitive awards are
brought, however—including fraud, product liability, business
negligence, insurance claims, asbestos-related lawsuits, and
employment claims—contain few obvious externality problems.
The recent Supreme Court case BMW v. Gore illustrates this
point. As this case illustrates, the true underlying quality of a car’s
paint job is valuable to customers. Providing such high-quality paint
jobs or handling procedures that cars never have to be retouched,
however, is costly. As there are no externalities in this situation,
customer demands will encourage firms to provide higher quality
paint jobs up until the point where the cost of doing so equals the
marginal benefit obtained by the customers. Thus, paint job quality
                                                 
3 Note that the probability of punishment theory does not apply very well to this
case, either. The probability of detection in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil spill
had to be close to 1.0. The award of punitive damages therefore cannot be justified
by the notion that they were necessary to get Exxon to internalize the expected
cost of the spill, ex ante. Issues raised in trial to determine imposition of punitive
damages, such as the plaintiff’s recklessness, also do not correspond well with the
probability of punishment theory of punitive awards.
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is assured even in the absence of punitive awards—and is enforced by
the firm’s reputational guarantee—up to the level and cost of quality
assurance that customers demand.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we present our
argument about the role of reputation in assuring contractual
performance, and the effect of punitive awards on firms’ reliance on
reputational guarantees. Section III reports on the sample of punitive
lawsuits we use to investigate punitive awards. In section IV we
report tests that attempt to explain the sizes of punitive awards using
data on a large number of punitive lawsuits from 1985 through June
1996. Sections V through VIII introduce several approaches to
examine the importance of punitive awards. In section V, we
measure the valuation impacts of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
affect the expected sizes of future punitive awards, both on the
market as a whole and on firms defending recent or current punitive
award lawsuits. Section VI reports on similar tests of the valuation
impacts of Congressional attempts in 1995 and 1996 to limit the
sizes of punitive awards. In section VII, we explore whether
Supreme Court decisions and news about punitive award legislation
affects company values differently, depending on firms’ exposures to
punitive award liability. Finally, section VIII examines the valuation
effects on the companies directly affected by individual punitive-
seeking lawsuits, the defendant firms. Section IX concludes.
II. The Theory of Punitive Damages
A. Guarantees Through Reputation or Privately Agreed to Penalties
Landes and Posner (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (1997)
argue that punitive awards help enforce contractual performance by
forcing all parties in a trading relationship to internalize the costs of
subpar performance. According to this argument, the prospect of
punitive liability offsets the chance that a party will not be held liable
for the any damages. The optimal punitive award therefore is
decreasing in the probability that the underperforming party will be
held liable.
Punitive awards surely increase the expected cost to subpar
contractual performance. What this line of reasoning misses,
however, is the fact that, in most contractual relationships, punitive
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awards are unnecessary to encourage optimal contractual
performance. Indeed, the prospect of punitive awards can encourage
too much investment to assure contractual performance, thereby
increasing costs and contractual assurance beyond the optimal levels.
To see this point, consider contractual performance in a situation
without the prospect of punitive awards. Contrary to the implication
of Polinsky and Shavell’s argument, this generally would not lead to
underinvestment in assuring contractual performance. Breaching
contracts, denying insurance claims, providing defective products,
committing fraud, and causing employees to work in unsafe
environments all impose costs to one of the parties in a trading
relationship. Parties have incentive to offer guarantees to others that
they will perform as promised.
As an example, insurance companies can be sued for wrongly
denying claims from customers. An insurance company could choose
to avoid such lawsuits by never denying claims. But such a policy is
costly because it would encourage false claims. To finance a no-
potential-for-lawsuit policy, the insurance company would have to
charge correspondingly high premiums to finance its high costs.
Presumably, some customers are unwilling to pay such high costs.
These customers prefer to buy insurance at lower rates from
companies that reserve the right to deny payments. While this can
prevent fraudulent or uncovered claims, it also increases the
probability that the company will deny coverage to those with valid
claims. Thus, customers and insurance companies can trade off the
cost of insurance with the probability the company will deny valid
claims. The optimal probability of denying claims—and the optimal
price for insurance—is one that at the margin equates the benefits
and costs.
Firms undoubtedly from time to time try to renege on promises
of how they will make their decisions to deny coverage, but a similar
problem exists here also. To the extent that insured individuals value
increasing the probability that they will not be “held up” by the
insurance company when coverage decisions are made, customers are
willing to pay the additional costs associated with firms guaranteeing
this outcome.
Consumers value reducing the probability that their implicit
agreement with the firm will be breached, but reducing that
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probability is costly. In the absence of the current punitive damage
system, consumers can reduce the probability of denial by buying
from insurance companies with large reputational investments or
ones that have agreed to high privately negotiated penalty clauses. At
some total penalty level, the cost to consumers of extra assurance
exceeds the incremental expected cost of having their insurance
claim denied. When the cost of denial is low or when insured
individuals have lower alternative methods of insuring themselves,
insurance companies will invest less in reputation and provide fewer
guarantees. We observe this behavior in other areas of life, such as
when people buy cars from fly-by-night dealers, or through
newspaper advertisements. Most people choosing to buy used cars
with little quality assurance probably are not making mistakes. They
undoubtedly face a relatively high probability of being defrauded, but
they also pay less for their cars.
The arguments are no different for breach of contract (Klein,
1996) or fraud (Darby and Karni, 1973; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; and
Lott, 1996), or other types of actions that give rise to punitive
lawsuits. To summarize the point, the wealth maximizing probability
of breach of contract or fraud is not zero: at some point, the costs of
reducing the probability further exceed the expected benefits.
A role for extra penalties, such as punitive damage awards, exists
when the action imposes costs on third parties. The most obvious
example of this involves environmental damages. As we have pointed
out elsewhere (Karpoff and Lott, 1993), another example is
innovations that decrease the cost of delivering subpar results in a
contractual relationship. For example, true innovations in
committing fraud alter the underlying probability of third parties
being defrauded because potential defrauders also learn the
innovation.4
                                                 
4 Learning of an action in which one party to a transaction delivers subpar
performance may alter the behavior of third parties. For example, learning of a
breach of contract can increase others' due diligence upon entering contracts
themselves. If they thus correct previously mistaken beliefs regarding the true
underlying probability of these third parties being defrauded, this information
represents an external benefit and not a cost.
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B. Substitution of Punitive Damages for Private Quality Assurance
Since private mechanisms do not completely eliminate the
occurrence of contractual breach or fraud, why not use punitive
damages to deter all problems of contractual breach or fraud? One
reason is that high penalties and low probabilities is a costly strategy.
When to rely on reputation rather than legal sanctions depends in
part on the substitutability of third party-imposed punitive damages
(and for some cases also criminal penalties) and reputation in
deterring contractual breach or fraud. If these third party-imposed
penalties and reputation are perfect substitutes, an increase in
expected penalties will have no effect on their incidence. Increases in
government penalties will simply reduce customer reliance on
reputation as a guarantor of promises.
There are several reasons to expect that third party-imposed
penalties are not perfect substitutes for reputation, however. As a
result, an increase in such penalties will cause a smaller decrease in
reputational investments, causing an overall increase in firms’
expected penalties from subpar contractual performance. This will
cause firms to decrease the undesirable incidents. But if there are no
externalities for the criminal penalties to internalize, the penalty will
also increase costs, harming consumers and dissipating wealth.
In previous work, we (1993, pp. 762-65) pointed out two reasons
that reputation and third party-imposed penalties are not perfect
substitutes. First, court imposed penalties are limited to cases where
evidence can be provided to a third party, while enforced
reputational losses rely on enforcement by the consumers. Second,
following Klein and Leffler (1981), reputation produces not only
deterrence but also takes the form of sunk investments that produce
additional services for customers. Thus, an increase in third party-
imposed penalties will result in smaller than dollar-for-dollar
reductions in reputational investments.
To the extent that punitive damages are large and variable, they
impose an additional cost on firms. As DeAngelo (1981) argues,
with well-functioning capital markets a publicly-held company can
be thought of as risk neutral in its valuation of cash flows. However,
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if “to play the game, you have to bet the corporation,”5 that is, if
punitive awards can be arbitrarily large, they have the potential to
throw defendant companies into financial distress. To avoid such
distress and the costs that it brings, firms may adjust their capital
structures or investment policies. They might also consider not just
the expected penalty of a fraudulent action, but also the variance of
the penalty.
To the extent that court imposed penalties are not perfect
substitutes for reputational penalties, imposing civil punitive or
criminal penalties that are greater than what people would have
chosen on their own will force too high a level of quality assurance to
be purchased. A deadweight loss is created as more is spent on
eliminating contractual breaches or fraud than consumers value the
reduction in the probability that these undesirable outcomes will
occur.
One argument in favor of legal suits is that allows others to learn
about a firm’s behavior. Yet, if customers value knowing about these
incidents more than the cost of producing this information, it will
pay for firms to convince their customers that the customers will
learn about incidents when they occur. Even if fines are a more
efficient mechanism to punish firms (and undoubtedly that is true in
some circumstances), penalty clauses could be enforced as part of
private arbitration agreements.
III. Description of the Punitive
Lawsuit Sample and Award Amounts
To investigate the sizes, determinants, and valuation impacts of
punitive awards, we collected information on lawsuits in which
plaintiffs sought punitive awards from a search using the key word
punitive of the Lexis/Nexis library, “All Verdicts.” This library
includes reports from such sources as LRP Publications’ Jury Verdict
Research, Jury Verdict Weekly, and the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America. Information on additional cases from 1990 through June
1996 was collected from the Lexis/Nexis National Law Review
                                                 
5 Quote attributed to Michael Horowitz, director of the Hudson Institute’s
Project for Civil Justice in Peter Passell, “The Split Over Punitive Awards in
Getting the Bad Guys,” New York Times, Thursday, July 10, 1997, p. D2..
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library. Each individual case was followed over time using these
sources to try to determine whether any awards were eventually
reduced on appeal. To be included in our later estimated impacts on
market value, the defendant must be a publicly traded corporation
with information available on the 1996 CRSP or 1996
COMPUSTAT databases. The names of many companies listed in
the Lexis/Nexis information do not exactly match the names of
companies listed in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases, or are
subsidiaries of publicly traded corporations. To ensure an accurate
match between the company names as listed in the Lexis/Nexis data
and the CRSP and COMPUSTAT data, we used Dun and
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Directory to identify company and
subsidiary names.
This search yielded information on 1979 lawsuits in which the
plaintiffs sought punitive awards from publicly traded companies
from January 1985 through June 1996. Table 1 reports the
distribution of the sample by the year in which data were reported
and the central topic of the lawsuit. Product liability lawsuits are the
most common type, with a total of 374 cases, and insurance-related
claims are second, with 315 cases. Then follows business negligence
claims with 291 cases, and employment-related claims (including job
discrimination, harassment, and contested dismissals) with 222
cases. Less frequent topics include claims of fraud, breach of
contract, and malpractice. The 318 cases classified as “miscellaneous”
include claims of premises liability, civil rights violations, unfair
competition, wrongful death, and toxic torts. The overall number of
suits increases from 1985 to the early 1990’s, and then declines in
1994 and 1995. Most of this growth from 1985 to 1990 appears to
have been driven by product liability, insurance, and business
negligence cases.
In classifying the cases, we used the classifications that were
provided for most cases by the publications from which we obtained
the cases. “Product Liability” suits occur when products are alleged
to have malfunctioned or contained a design defect. For example,
Chrysler paid $300,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in
punitive damages for “knowingly” producing a defective steering
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wheel.6 Other cases include such incidents as a women setting
herself on fire with a malfunctioning cigarette lighter.7
“Fraud” involves cases where a firm cheats or is accused of
cheating on implicit contracts with suppliers, employees, franchises,
or customers. The following are examples: plaintiffs recovered $1.8
million in compensatory damages and interest plus $2.5 million in
punitive damages because a defendant had failed to properly
investigate a limited partnership that plaintiffs were investing in;8 an
independent Chevron dealer sued Chevron for fraudulently failing to
account for fuel removed from the plaintiff’s station and then
allegedly punishing the dealer for complaining about this by
terminating his dealership.9
“Insurance claims” entail insurance companies denying coverage
for a wide range of problems, such as refusing to reimburse all the
costs demanded by plaintiffs from a fire10 or medical expenses.11
“Employment” litigation encompasses wrongful termination,
discrimination, and sexual or discriminatory harassment.
“Malpractice” cases involve failure by pharmaceutical companies to
warn of risk of medication.12 “Breach of Contract” suits occur over
failure of firms to deliver the promised products13 or when a
                                                 
6 Dean v. Chrysler, Verdictum Juris Press, No. SF782213, June 30, 1986 to
August 1, 1986.
7 Ramona Boroff & Paul Boroff (her husband) v. the BIC Corp and Munford,
Inc, d/b/a Majik Market Stores, Florida Jury Verdict Reporter, No. 90:2-46,
February 1990.
8 Leslie Alan Lin ET vs Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. and Batehill, Inc.,
Jury Verdicts Weekly, Case no. 166389, May 14, 1990.
9 Richard Delong v. Chevron USA Inc and Lee Carlson, Jury Verdicts Weekly,
Case no. 89447, April 24, 1986.
10 Dorothy F. Long et. al. vs Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Jury Verdicts
Weekly, case no. 329896, January 17, 1986.
11 Grossman vs. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Verdictum Juris Press, no. 886-91c,
April 22, 1986.
12 Fanny Ilsa Staps et. al. vs Alcon Laboratories, Inc. Case no. 82-1867,
September 19, 1986.
13 Trans Meridian, Inc. vs Amstar Corporation, Jury Verdicts Weekly, case no.
C85-5389, October 1, 1986.
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company took away a market from a distributor.14 “Miscellaneous” is
obviously a very broad category, but involves everything from
chlorine gas leaks which harmed third parties15 to plaintiffs who
objected to Disney Land’s request that police detain them for
intoxicated behavior.16
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the sizes of the
compensatory and punitive awards for each type of punitive lawsuit.
We also partition the sample into cases that resulted in jury verdict
findings for plaintiffs, defendant verdicts, and settlements. The most
striking finding is that punitive and compensatory awards in
settlements are so small relative to the penalties obtained in plaintiff
verdicts. The mean punitive damages in settlements are never more
than 17 percent the size of the mean punitive damages in plaintiff
verdicts, and in seven categories punitive damages never occur. The
median punitive award in settlements is zero for all the categories.
Even assuming that settlements may not properly disaggregate
punitive and compensatory awards, the mean total settlement is less
than a third of the mean total award in plaintiff verdicts for nine of
the ten categories of cases. Only for vehicular accidents is the mean
total settlement larger, and in that case it is only 21 percent bigger.
Comparisons between the settlements and overall sample yield
similar lopsided differences, with the settlement awards being
consistently smaller. Admittedly, the set of firms for which
settlement information is available may differ from firms that have
hidden any settlement. These values also do not control for other
influences such as firm size. These initial results, however, make it
difficult to argue that excluding settlements is likely to bias
downward any estimates of the sizes of punitive damage awards.
                                                 
14 Richard Talbot vs AMF Corporation, Jury Verdicts Weekly, Case no. CV 84-
3614, October 27, 1986.
15 Allen et. al. vs Suburban Water Systems, Confidential Report for Attorneys,
case no. VC 006 498, December 21, 1993.
16 R. Doss and Michael Garrett vs Disney Land, Jury Verdicts Weekly, no. 40-
93-83, February 25, 1986.
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IV. Determinants of Punitive Award Amounts
Table 3 reports three attempts to model the predictability of
punitive awards. In each regression, the dependent variable is the
punitive award. The regressors include the following variables:
• The compensatory award. According to the probability-of-
detection theory, punitive awards should be a positive multiple of
the compensatory award. Furthermore, the multiple should be
inversely correlated with the probability of detection and
punishment. This implies that the coefficient on the
compensatory award should be positive. Alternatively, juries may
consider compensatory and punitive awards to be substitutes. If
this is the case, the punitive award should be negatively related to
the compensatory amount. It also is possible that juries consider
the distinction between compensatory and punitive awards to be
arbitrary, and assign total awards to plaintiffs without much
regard to their classifications. In this case, the punitive and
compensatory amounts should be unrelated.
• The square of the compensatory award. We include this term
to allow for a nonlinear relation between the punitive and
compensatory awards.
• The natural log of the market value of the defendant company’s
common stock, measured at the end of the year immediately
preceding the year in which a settlement or verdict is reached.
We conjecture that the award amount is positively related to firm
size, for two reasons. First, we note cases in our sample in which
award amounts are reduced for firms that are financially
troubled. Second, we conjecture that award amounts are
positively related to juries’ perceptions of the defendants’ abilities
to pay. Hence, inclusion of firm size allows us to examine the
notion that punitive award amounts are larger for firms with
deep financial pockets.
• An index of the firm’s industry-related exposure to punitive
lawsuits. Some lines of business attract more and different types
of punitive lawsuits than others. Automobile manufacturers, for
13 Punitive Damages
example, are defendants in many lawsuits following automobile
accidents, in which plaintiffs allege some type of product failure.
We conjecture that punitive awards may differ systematically
across industries, and according to the frequencies with which
firms in an industry are targets of punitive lawsuits.
To test this hypothesis, we created an index of each firm’s
industry-related exposure to punitive award liability. Using data from
all 1,979 lawsuits in our sample, we partitioned the lawsuits by year
and the two-digit SIC code of the defendant company. SIC codes
are taken from the 1996 CRSP database, and when not available on
CRSP, from the 1996 COMPUSTAT database. The number of
lawsuits in each year-SIC classification then is divided by the
number of CRSP-listed firms with the same two-digit SIC. This
ratio provides a measure of the relative intensity of punitive lawsuits
in each year for each SIC category. The index of industry-related
punitive award liability is then the three-year moving average of this
ratio, centered on the year of the lawsuit being considered.
Therefore, all firms in the same SIC category with punitive lawsuits
in the same year have the same index of punitive award liability.
Firms with lawsuits in different years, or in different SIC codes,
therefore generally have different index values.
• The number of defendants. Some of the defendants of lawsuits
in our sample share potential liability with other parties. We
include this variable to measure whether the punitive award is
related to the number of parties that might share responsibility
for an award.
Finally, we include dummy variables to control for the lawsuit
type (using the categories reported in Table 1), the year, and the
state in which the trial is heard (or in the case of settlements, the
lawsuit is filed).17 Results reported in Table 3 exclude the Exxon
Valdez oil spill case because the $5 billion punitive award in this case
                                                 
17 Additional estimates were also made for smaller sample which included
information on whether the incident had involved a death or an injury, but the
coefficient on these variables were statistically insignificant and did not alter the
overall explanatory power of our regressions.
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is an extreme outlier. (The next largest punitive award in our sample
is $250 million.)
Model 1 in Table 3 uses information from 1078 lawsuits for
which we have sufficient data on all variables. Some of these lawsuits
were resolved in defendants’ favor and have zero compensatory and
punitive awards. Others have positive compensatory awards, but zero
punitive awards. To accommodate the large number of zero punitive
awards, we use a Tobit regression model. Model 2 includes data on
807 cases in which the compensatory award is positive. Because
many of the punitive awards in these cases are zero, we use a Tobit
regression model here also. Model 3 includes only cases in which
positive punitive amounts were awarded. It is estimated using
ordinary least squares.
The specification in Model 3 is similar to that estimated by
Eisenberg (1997). Similar to Eisenberg’s findings, the adjusted-R2
implies that the model explains about 51 percent of the variation in
punitive damages. Models 1 and 2, in contrast, imply that less than 2
percent of the variation in punitive damages can be explained when
we include observations for which punitive damages are not levied.
As predicted by Polinsky (1997), the bottom line is that we can
explain the level of punitive damages given that we know that they
will be awarded, but we have an exceedingly difficult time explaining
any of the overall variation in awards.
Despite the extremely low R2 in our regressions explaining the
overall variation in punitive damages, the true ability to predict these
outcomes ex ante is likely to be even lower because it is only after the
verdict that the exact amount of compensatory damages are known.
While plaintiffs and defendants are likely to guess the level of
compensatory damages, they are unlikely to be able to predict them
perfectly. Indeed, the ability to predict compensatory damages also
appears very limited (e.g., regressing compensatory damages on
punitive awards and the other variables we employ still produces a
pseudo R2 of less than 3 percent). In any case, to the extent that
knowing the actual ex post compensatory damages provides better
information on the jury itself than could be guessed at before the end
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of the trial, we are overestimating the amount of the variation in
punitive damages that a firm is able to predict.18
In all three specifications the coefficients for compensatory
awards imply that punitive awards rise less than proportionately with
compensatory damages. This is consistent with the punitive damages
rising with the probability of detection, and that the probability of
detection is rising with the size of the loss. However, including the
Exxon Valdez case reverses the signs on both the compensatory
award and compensatory award squared variables. The new values
are also quite statistically significant at least at the .01 percent level
for a two-tailed t-test. If punitive damages are being linked to the
compensatory awards by the probability of detection, including the
Exxon case indicates that probability is falling more than
proportionately to the increase in compensatory awards. Yet, it is
difficult to put a lot of weight on estimates that vary so dramatically
with the inclusion of a single observation.
Sunstein et al. (1997, p. 5, fn. 21) argue that their work on the
unpredictability of punitive awards is consistent with Eisenberg et
al.’s claim that the log of compensatory awards can explain this
variation, but they explain that this is due to the fact that it is log
compensatory awards and not simple compensatory awards that
explain the variation in punitive damages.19 However, at least for our
sample, using either the log of compensatory damages, compensatory
damages, or compensatory damages and those damages squared all
produced very similar results. For example, reestimating the first
specification in Table 3 with these changes shows that the coefficient
for log damages is 2,005,938 (t-statistic=14.008) and the pseudo
R2=.021, while the coefficient for the simple linear impact of
compensatory awards is .814 (t-statistic=12.284) with the pseudo
R2=.016. Contrary to their argument that it is the unbounded scale
of monetary damages that produces the unpredictability, we find that
                                                 
18 For example, one type of information might be if there is a positive correlation
between a jury’s desire to overestimate compensatory damages and its desire to
provide a high level of compensatory damages.
19 Sunstein et. al. (1997, p. 5, fn. 21) write that: “We find no inconsistency
between their analyses of real jury awards and our experimental data. Indeed, we
agree with their conclusion that log awards are fairly predictable. But defendants
and plaintiffs live in a world of dollars, not of log dollars.”
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it the decision of whether to impose punitive damages that generates
the great randomness.
The other variables also produced interesting results. The
regressions supply some evidence that firms with deeper pockets
(measured here by greater market value) are associated with higher
punitive damages. Yet, even this finding is very sensitive to how the
regression is specified. Rerunning these regressions with firm market
value instead of the log of market value produces a positive but
statistically insignificant relationship between firm size an the level
of punitive damages. It is not obvious why we expect judges or juries
to be setting penalties as a function of the log of firm size as opposed
to simply firm size. Neither the index of the vulnerability of different
industries to punitive damages nor the number of defendants seems
related to the level of punitive damages. The states with the lowest
probabilities of high punitive damages were California, Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Dakota, while Alabama and
Texas stood out as offering the highest judgments.
Specifications 1 and 3 in Table 4 use the first two specifications
in Table 3 to predict the imposition of punitive damages. Because of
the statistical insignificance of firm size in explaining whether
punitive damages will be awarded and because using this variable
greatly reduces our sample size, specifications 2 and 4 reestimate the
other regressions with the firm size variable removed. Regressions
using the logit procedure are reported, though probit estimates
produced very similar results. These regressions imply that only
between 18 and 22 percent in the variation of the probability that
punitive damages will be awarded can be explained. Generally, the
results show that the probability of a punitive damage award
increases at a decreasing rate with the level of compensatory awards
and that increasing the number of defendants reduces this
probability.
V. Assessing the Impact of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions on Market Value
Despite the initial work on the predictability of punitive
damages, the importance of punitive damages has only been
addressed indirectly. Fortunately, recent Supreme Court decisions
and congressional attempts to cap liability payments provide ways to
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test the importance of punitive awards. This section will concentrate
on seven Supreme Court decisions between April 1986 and May
1996 which dealt with a variety of issues over whether punitive
damages can ever be excessive (see Table 5). The first five cases
refused to rule that punitive damages were excessive, though in the
Browning-Ferris case the Court based its decision to allow the award
on the defendant’s failure to argue that punitive damages awarded
violated the Due Process Clause. The Honda Motor case limited
punitive damages, but the reasoning was based on peculiarities in
Oregon law which were not applicable to other states. BMW of
North America v. Gore, despite its reliance on federalist concerns
and the vagueness of what constituted excessive punitive awards, was
the first direct attempt by the Court to limit these damages.
To investigate the importance of punitive damages on firm value,
we performed three types of event study analysis: the impact of these
decisions on market-wide stock returns, on firms with active punitive
awards cases, and a cross-sectional analysis of firms to see how much
of the variation can be explained by such variables as the industry’s
exposure to punitive damage suits. For the Supreme Court cases we
also have three different event dates: when writ of certiorari was
granted, when arguments were heard, and when the Court’s decision
was rendered.
Table 6 presents the market-wide stock abnormal returns from
these decisions using event windows for days -1 to 1 and -1 to 10
around these events. Only the stock returns around the BMW v.
Gore decision date tell a story that consistently implies a negative
impact on firms from punitive damages. The Pacific Mutual Life
case produces many significant estimates, but it is difficult to tell a
consistent story with these results. One could argue that the negative
impacts from granting writ and when arguments were heard
occurred because this was not the right case to bring before the
Court and that when arguments were heard this confirmed the
business communities’ fears. The Court’s 7-to-1 decision that
despite the punitive damages being large relative to compensatory
damages due process was not violated clearly did not alleviate fears of
future punitive damage awards. Most disconcerting is the large
positive effects associated with the decision. In fact, for the longer
event window, this effect is so large that it more than completely
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offsets the negative reactions shown for the two preceding dates.
The positive effects implied by the Pacific verdict are also greater
than the more explainable positive effect indicated for the BMW
verdict. The effects of the Pacific verdict may simply be noise, but it
is difficult to discern strong evidence that punitive damages have a
negative impact on firm value from this table.
To test whether the Court’s decisions primarily impacted firms
with recent or pending cases, we included firms in our sample which
had court decisions within several different periods of time before
and after the three Supreme Court’s dates for each case of the seven
cases. Presumably, if these decisions matter for anyone, it should
especially be so for firms facing legal action. While abnormal stock
returns were examined for defendant companies that had verdicts
within 3 months or 6 months of the Supreme Court action, only
companies whose verdicts were rendered within 12 months of the
action were reported as none of the other results were statistically
significant. Given the short time allowed for Appeals to be filed of a
month or so, shorter time periods before the Supreme Court are
desirable, but they did not produce significant results.
Again, even with the long 12 month period, Table 7 makes it
difficult to discern any real pattern. If punitive damages were
important for these firms, the first five cases should be associated
with reductions in market value, while the last two should be
associated with increases. For the five cases which did not restrict
punitive damages, Supreme Court actions are associated with
significant abnormal returns in three cases and significant abnormal
returns in two cases. Overall, seven results imply that these actions
reduced the values of firms with active cases, but six results imply the
reverse. The Honda Motor and BMW cases are also mixed with the
only significant coefficient indicating a drop in market value from
cert. being granted for Honda.
Finally, Table 8 attempts to explain the cross-sectional variation
in firm market value. We examined how these changes depended
upon whether firms faced the highest expected compensatory or
punitive awards, the level of the firm’s market value, or whether the
firms were in industries that were particularly susceptible to suits.
However, while many of the results are statistically significant, it is
difficult to infer any consistent story supporting the notion that
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punitive damages matter to firms. Presumably firms facing the
highest expected punitive damages should have expected the largest
benefits from either the BMW or the Honda decisions, yet the
coefficients on punitive damages are always negative (and even
significantly so in one case). While our simplest measure of an
industry’s exposure to punitive damages is positively and significantly
related to abnormal market returns for the BMW case, the net effect
of index is actually negative because the interaction of the index with
a firm’s market value has a consistently larger impact.20 The
regressions for the Honda case produce coefficient estimates which
are difficult to reconcile with the estimates for the BMW case.
VI. Assessing the Impact of Recent
Congressional Attempts to Limit Punitive Awards
With Republicans sweeping control of both the Senate and
House of Representatives in November 1994, the 105th Congress
promised to be a battle ground over liability reform. While the
legislation was ultimately vetoed by President Clinton and Congress
was unable to override, at least eight event dates are possible. On
March 10, 1995, the House of Representatives passed sweeping
legislation that would limit punitive damages to $250,000 or three
times the compensatory damages, whichever was greater. Soon after
this, a bi-partisan group of Senators on March 16th proposed their
own greatly narrowed version of product liability reform primarily
directed at very small firms. The press widely interpreted this as
evidence that the Senate was going to greatly weaken the strong
reforms passed by the House. Despite these early concerns, the
Senate did eventually pass its own bill on May 10th which was fairly
close to the original House bill. The reform legislation was then
placed on hold for a while as Congress focused its attention on the
budget. Indeed, it was not until March 18, 1996 that the House-
Senate conference committee finally reported out legislation that
conformed to the general limits passed by the House, and at this
time the White House announced that it would likely veto the bill.
                                                 
20 Rerunning the regressions in Table 8 with only the indexes of industry
exposure without the market value interactions produces a negative but statistically
insignificant effect.
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The bill limited punitive damages for defective-product cases in state
and federal courts to $ 250,000 or twice the amount of actual
damages, whichever is higher. The House (March 21, 1996) and the
Senate (March 29, 1996) passed this compromise, but neither vote
was by the necessary two-thirds majority. On May 2nd Clinton
vetoed the bill and the House failed to override it on May 9th.21
If punitive damages are bad for firms, we should expect March
10, 1995; May 10, 1995; and March 18, 1996 to be associated with
increased stock values, while March 16, 1995; May 2, 1996; and
May 9, 1996 should reduce stock values. The House and Senate
votes on the conference bill are more ambiguous, but despite the
overwhelming votes for the conference compromise they were short
of veto-proof margins and thus probably signaled that the bill would
ultimately fail. We thus expect that these votes would be associated
with drops in market value.
Using these eight event dates, we reran a similar set of tests to
those reported for the Supreme Court cases. The first column in
Table 9 reports the market-wide stock returns for each of these eight
dates. Despite the large political battles fought over this legislation,
these events had even less of an effect on the overall market than the
Supreme Court decisions. None of the eight dates are associated
with statistically significant changes in stock market values. Even the
point estimates, which are all positive, appear quite unrelated to the
theory that punitive damages are important.
The second column is analogous to our results in Table 7, where
we investigate the impact of the proposed legal changes for
companies that are defendants in unresolved punitive award lawsuits.
However, in this case because the law will not affect recently decided
cases, we only look at the market value effect on firms whose cases
are decided between the event date and the end of the sample period
in June 1996. Because of this our sample of pending lawsuits
declines over time, from 125 cases for the first date to 8 for the last
                                                 
21 After the 1994 election many states passed laws limiting punitive damages and
this will weaken the overall impact of changes in federal law. The bias will be
towards not find an impact from these legislative changes. The proposed federal
law was also written to apply to only those cases which were filed after the law
went into effect. This will not effect either the market wide estimated impact or
the impact using the industry indexes.
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date. The sample size is dramatically smaller for all the 1996 events,
with the estimates for the adoption of the conference committee
report examining only 17 firms. Despite this seven of the eight
results are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level for a
two-tailed t-test, and seven of the eight signs are consistent with the
hypothesis that the threat of large punitive damage awards adversely
affect those firms facing suits. While the results imply that market
values declined by less than half the drop observed in our earlier
study of corporate fraud cases (Karpoff and Lott, 1993, p. 776), the
t-statistics are surprisingly large and the changes in stock prices
appear to fairly consistent across all the firms examined at each event
date. The last event, where the House failed to override President
Clinton’s veto, implies not only the largest impact from these legal
debates, but it is the one event which fails to conform to the
hypothesis that potentially large punitive damages matter and it is
also statistically significant. Why this last event date differs so
dramatically from the previous dates is unclear, but overall these
eight dates imply that for those firms facing suits attempts to cap
punitive damages mattered.
Finally, Table 10 attempts to explain the cross-sectional variation
in stock prices shown in the second column in Table 9. Because of
the small sample size available for 1996, these estimates examine
only the three events in 1995. As in Tables 3 and 8, we attempted to
explain the punitive damages as a function of the compensatory
award, firm size, an index of industry exposure. Two conclusions can
be drawn from this table. First, this model explains little of the
overall variation in firm market values, with the largest adjusted-R2
equal to only .12. Second, while the average effects shown in Table 9
are consistent with the hypothesis that the threat of large punitive
damages matter, it is difficult to infer such a consistent story from
these results. For example, the results in Table 9 imply that the
second event date has the opposite effect of the first and third event
dates on market values, but the coefficients for all three regressions
shown are the same. Firms in industries facing the greatest threat
from suits appear to experience the greatest gains in market value
whether or not the event is associated with good or bad news
concerning caps on punitive damages, though the effect is not
statistically significant for panel A. Similarly, it is not clear why the
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 22
higher prospects of a cap should lower market values for firms facing
the largest compensatory awards, but that is what panels A and B
imply.
The log of firm size appears related to higher punitive awards for
the first and third event dates, but while the coefficient is
insignificant for the second date, it implies that the threat of higher
awards increases the value of the largest firms the most. The
interaction between the industry exposure index and firm size
implies that whatever the effects of firm size, they are the greatest for
those firms in industries with the least exposure to suits.
While Tables 9 and 10 provide evidence that at least for those
firms facing suits the prospects of capping punitive damages provides
benefits, there is no marketwide effect and it is very difficult to
explain the effect across those firms which are facing suits. Punitive
damages may be important to those firms presently facing suits, but
even the reason for this is difficult to discern.
VII. The Valuation Impacts of Legal
Changes on Firms with Punitive Exposure
The tests reported in previous sections examine the impact of
Supreme Court decisions and legislation affecting punitive damages
on market-wide stock price changes, and on firms that are
defendants in current or pending punitive award lawsuits. In this
section we examine whether changes in the legal environment affect
firms in systematically different ways. In particular, do changes in
the legal environment impact firms differently, depending on the
firms’ exposure to punitive award lawsuits?
To examine this issue, we estimate cross-sectional regressions for
each date representing an important Supreme Court decision or
news about a key legislative development. The dependent variable in
each regression is each firm’s cumulative abnormal return for the
three-day period centered on this date, which we refer to as date 0.
Abnormal returns are calculated from a one-factor market model
estimated over days -230 through -31 relative to date 0, using the
CRSP equal weighted portfolio as the market index. All firms listed
on the 1996 CRSP tapes, and with at least 60 days’ data during the
estimation period, are included in each cross-sectional regression.
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The key independent variable in each regression is our first index
of industry-related exposure to punitive award liability. Because of
the well-known effect of firm size on cross-sectional differences in
returns, we also include the natural log of the market value of
common stock as a control variable.
Table 11 summarizes the results of these tests. Panel A contains
the results for two important Supreme Court decisions, regarding
Honda Motor Co. V. Oberg and BMW of North America v. Gore. Panel
B contains results for each of the key legislation dates examined in
Table 9. In none of the individual cross-sectional regressions is the
coefficient for the industry-related index of punitive exposure
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In one case, regarding
the March 18, 1996 press announcement regarding a product
liability bill, the index coefficient is positive and significant at the 10
percent level. This isolated result is consistent with the hypothesis
that stock price changes to news that some punitive awards might be
limited were positively related to the firms’ exposures to punitive
award liability. Overall, however, there is little evidence to support
the notion that firm value changes are sensitive to the firms’
exposure to punitive liabilities.
To summarize our findings to this point, we examine the impacts
on firm values of important Supreme Court decisions and recent
legislation regarding punitive awards. Most evidence indicates that
market-wide stock price changes, as well as the stock prices of firms
that are defendants in current or pending punitive award cases, are
not significantly impacted by these changes in the legal environment.
Furthermore, most firms’ stock price changes are not significantly
related to the firms’ exposure to punitive award liability.
We do find some limited evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that changes in the legal environment affect firm values. In
particular, the 1996 BMW Supreme Court decision corresponds to a
statistically significant increase in all firms’ values, particularly for
firms with significant exposure to punitive award liability. Also, news
reports of pending legislation aimed at limiting the sizes of punitive
awards are associated with positive changes in the values of firms
with pending punitive award cases. In the next section, we examine
the valuation effects not of changes in the legal environment, but of
actual punitive awards decisions.
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VIII. The Valuation Impacts of Punitive
Lawsuits on Defendant Companies
A. Average valuation impacts of press announcements about punitive
lawsuits
In this section we examine the valuation effects on defendant
companies when punitive award lawsuits or their outcomes are
publicized. To do so, we searched the Lexis/Nexis “All News”
database for newspaper stories of punitive award lawsuits. Of the
1,249 cases in our sample in which the defendant firm is listed on
the 1996 CRSP daily returns tape, we found at least one news story
each for 351 cases. The type and timeliness of news coverage of these
cases varies widely. We group the initial press reports into three
groups: pre-verdict announcements, verdict or settlement
announcements, and post-verdict announcements. Verdict or
settlement announcements, in turn, consist of settlements, defense
verdicts, and plaintiff verdicts. Post-verdict announcements consist
of information that is favorable, unfavorable, or neutral for the
defendant firm.
Table 12 reports on the average two-day abnormal stock returns
for the initial press announcements of punitive award lawsuits for all
351 cases and for each announcement type. The two-day event
window consists of the day before plus the day of the initial press
report. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the
actual two-day return minus a forecast return from a one-factor
market model. We estimate the market model using trading days -
230 through -31 relative to the initial press date, and measure
market returns using the CRSP equal-weighted index with
dividends.
For all 351 initial press announcements, the average two-day
abnormal stock return is -0.45%. The t-statistic is -2.70, which is
statistically significant at the one percent level. The binomial sign
test statistic is -1.91, which is significant at the 10 percent level.
These results indicate that, on average, the initial press report of a
lawsuit seeking punitive damages is associated with a small but
statistically significant decrease in the defendant company’s stock
value.
The valuation impact is not uniform across announcement types,
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however. For initial announcements about an upcoming or currently
pending lawsuit, the average abnormal return is -1.02% with a t-
statistic of -2.86. For the 188 cases in which the initial
announcement is of a plaintiff verdict, the average abnormal return is
-0.62% with a t-statistic of -2.74. Thus, the initial announcement of
an upcoming or plaintiff verdict is associated with a statistically
significant decrease in share values, on average.
In contrast, the average reaction to post-verdict announcements
that are favorable to the defendant firm is positive, 1.29%, and
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. “Favorable”
announcements include news that the firm has won the right to
appeal an earlier verdict, or that the award amount had been
reduced. Unfavorable post-verdict news, which includes
announcements that the firm failed in an attempt to gain an appeal
or have the award reduced, is associated with a small negative but
statistically insignificant average stock price reaction. Also
statistically insignificant are the average reactions to post-verdict
news that we label neutral, and initial announcements of settlements.
The average abnormal return to settlement announcements is a large
-2.43%, but the t-statistic is only 1.35. Contrary to our earlier results
in Section III, the point estimate is consistent with Polinsky’s
hypothesis that settlements involve the largest losses.
Many lawsuits received press attention after their initial news
articles. The right-hand column in Table 12 reports on the valuation
impacts of the first subsequent article that reported substantially new
information about the lawsuit. Most types of subsequent
announcement average abnormal returns are not significantly
different from zero. Averaging across all subsequent announcements,
for example, the mean abnormal return is -0.33% with a t-statistic of
-1.15. The one exception is for plaintiff verdicts in cases that
previously were the subjects of a press article, where the mean two-
day abnormal stock return is -1.36%, with a t-statistic of -2.37. We
interpret this as indicating that plaintiff verdicts are not fully
anticipated, and are associated with declines in the share values of
the defendant companies.
The results imply that publicity about lawsuits involving actual
or potential punitive awards are associated, on average, with declines
in the values of the defendant companies. This is true particularly for
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any initial pre-verdict publicity about current or pending lawsuits, as
well as for verdicts in favor of plaintiffs. Announcements of plaintiff
verdicts are associated with stock value losses, on average, even for
cases that previously received press attention.
B. Average changes in defendant firms’ market value of equity
While punitive lawsuits are bad news for defendant companies,
the average valuation impact is small in percentage terms. In Table
13 we report summary statistics on the dollar magnitude of the
abnormal returns. For each firm, we compute the dollar change in
the market value of equity by multiplying the firm’s initial
announcement two-day abnormal return by the market value of its
common stock, computed ten calendar days before the initial press
announcement. The distribution of company values is highly
skewed, so the distribution of the change in the market value of
equity is skewed and contains many extreme values. For the whole
sample, the change in the market value of equity ranges from a low
of -$2,019 million to a high of $1,802 million. To draw inferences
about the average magnitudes of the changes in value, we therefore
focus on the median changes. Table 13 also reports the changes in
the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of market value
changes.
Over all firms, the median change in the market value of equity is
negative, -$2.9 million. As a basis for comparison, Karpoff and Lott
(1993) report a median market value loss to firms investigated or
charged in criminal fraud to be $5.5 million, and Karpoff, Lee, and
Vendrzyk (1997) find that the median value loss to contractors
charged with defense procurement fraud is $5.0 million. Based on
these medians, the average announcement period market value loss
for defendant companies in punitive lawsuits is approximately half as
large as that for firms involved with criminal or defense procurement
fraud.
As might be expected, the median market value losses differ
according to the nature of the initial press announcement. The
median changes in market value are negative for pre-verdict
announcements, defense verdicts, settlements, plaintiff verdicts, and
post-verdict unfavorable information. Median changes in market
value are positive for neutral and favorable post-verdict
announcements.
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C. The reputational effects of punitive award lawsuits
The market value losses for pre-verdict announcements,
settlements, and plaintiff verdicts provide insight into the nature of
the costs of punitive-seeking lawsuits on the defendant companies.
For pre-verdict announcements, the median market value loss is $2.4
million. The median total award eventually reached for these cases is
$1.7 million, or 71% of the initial market value loss. For settlements,
the median total award is $0.8 million, which is 42% of the median
announcement period market value loss for these firms. The median
total amount awarded by juries in the 193 plaintiff announcements is
$6.9 million, or 81% of the $8.5 million median market value loss
upon the initial announcements of these cases.
These figures imply that pre-verdict news, settlements, and
adverse jury verdicts have consequences that, on average, are more
costly than the nominal amount of the awards. One possibility is
that publicity about the lawsuit, or about an adverse punitive award,
imposes reputational costs on the defendant firm. Such costs can
arise from an increase in the firm’s costs, or decrease in sales, that
result from publicity about the case. As examples: product liability
charges can decrease demand for the firm’s product, breach of
contract charges can increase contracting costs, and charges of
discrimination or harassment by employees can raise the reservation
wages of current or prospective employees.
Our estimates suggest that the reputational costs of punitive
lawsuits can be substantial. Consider, for example, adverse jury
verdicts. If the only cost is the amount of the award, the average
valuation impact of the verdict would be no greater than $6.9
million. A lower-bound estimate of the median reputational cost
therefore is the difference between the median market value loss and
this amount, or $1.6 million. If investors were aware of the lawsuit,
however, the implied reputational cost is much higher. Suppose that
the ex ante likelihood of an adverse jury ruling is 50%, and suppose
further that the firm’s pre-verdict market value reflects this
expectation. Then a drop in value of $8.5 million upon the
announcement implies that the ex ante total expected cost to the
firm is twice that, or $17.0 million. Thus, if the jury-awarded cost to
the firm is only $6.9 million, the implied reputational cost is
approximately $10.1 million (equal to $17.0 million - $6.9 million).
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These figures imply that the reputational loss comprises a large
share of the total cost to firms that have adverse jury verdicts in
punitive award lawsuits. Since many jury awards are reduced through
appeal or post-verdict settlements, the portion of the total $17.0
million loss that can be attributed to reputation may be even larger
than the $10.1 million we estimate here.
It is possible to back out estimates of the implied reputational
cost using data on pre-verdict and settlement announcement market
value losses, compared to the median awards in those cases. As
reported above, the median awards in these cases are even smaller
relative to the median market value losses than for the plaintiff
verdict subsample. The uncertainty surrounding the outcomes for
these cases differs also. For settlements, for example, the uncertainty
about the size of the award is reduced to zero. Using median values,
we estimate that the reputational cost is approximately 58% of the
median market value loss in these cases.
Table 14 presents summary information that permits us to
investigate the sizes of the reputational costs of different lawsuit
types. For each lawsuit type, we report summary measures of the loss
in market value upon the initial press announcement, the size of the
total award, the difference between the market value loss and the
total award, and the ratio of the total award to the size of the market
value loss. We include only cases for which the initial press
announcement is of a pending lawsuit, a settlement, or a plaintiff
verdict, and exclude defense verdicts and post-verdict
announcements. In a small number of cases, the change in the
market value of equity is very small compared to the total award,
implying extreme positive and negative values for the ratio of the
penalty to the loss in market value. Since, for most firms, this ratio is
small, the inclusion of such extreme values swamps any measure of
the sample mean. We therefore exclude 41 cases for which the
absolute value of the ratio of the total award to the loss in the market
value of equity is greater than 2.0. Of the excluded cases, 22 have
positive values of this ratio, and 19 have negative values.22
                                                 
22 Thus, the exclusion of these cases does not materially influence the median
values reported in Table 14. Among the excluded extreme values, the largest in
absolute value is -1097. (A negative value implies that the firm's market value of
equity increased during the two-day announcement period.)
29 Punitive Damages
Over all lawsuit types in this reduced sample, the median loss in
market value is $9.6 million. The median total award is $3.9 million.
Again, this comparison of medians suggests that, on average, firms
experience market value losses that are not completely explained by
the size of the award. This point is implied also by the fact that the
median ratio of the total award to the market value loss is only 0.01.
(The mean is 0.16.)
Across lawsuit types, none of the median ratios of the total award
to the change in market value of equity approach 1.0, suggesting
that, the implied reputational penalties are substantial for all lawsuit
types. In dollar terms, the largest implied median reputational costs
are for business negligence ($22.1 million) and employment-related
($16.2 million) lawsuits. Substantial reputational costs are also
implied for fraud ($8.1 million), vehicular accident ($5.8 million),
and insurance claim ($3.3 million) lawsuits. These figures must be
regarded as rough estimates only, however. As reported, the median
reputational losses implied for breach of contract and products
liability lawsuits are negative. For asbestos-related lawsuits, the
median ratio of total award to the loss in market value is negative.
Negative values arise when the announcement period abnormal
return, and hence, the measured change in equity value, is positive.
The fact that the median values sometimes are negative indicates
that our estimates are highly sensitive to estimation and small sample
size problems.
D. Determinants of the cross-section of abnormal returns to initial
publicity about the lawsuits
Table 15 reports on several ordinary least squares regressions that
are used to investigate the determinants of the cross-section of
abnormal returns to initial publicity about the punitive award
lawsuits. For these tests, we use data on all the 287 observations for
which the initial press announcements are about a pending lawsuit,
settlement, or verdict. (Post-verdict initial announcements are
excluded.) The dependent variable is the two-day announcement
period abnormal return divided by its standard error. Independent
variables include characteristics of the lawsuit and the defendant
firm.
In Model 1, the regressors include measures of firm size, an index
of the firm’s exposure to punitive award lawsuits, the sizes of the
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compensatory and punitive awards, and dummy variables for the
type of announcement. The abnormal return is positively and
significantly related to the natural log of the value of the firm’s
common stock. Further investigation reveals that this result partly is
attributable to several small firms for which the standardized
announcement period abnormal return is negative and large in
magnitude. Even excluding these cases, however, the coefficient on
the log of the market value of equity is positive and statistically
significant.
The positive relation does not imply that large firms have
positive announcement period abnormal returns, however. Even
among the top half of the firms partitioned by the market value of
equity, the average standardized abnormal return is negative.23
Rather, the positive relationship indicates that the percentage
decrease in firm value upon the initial press announcement of a
punitive lawsuit is relatively small for large firms. We interpret this
as indicating that the proportionate impact of a punitive lawsuit on
firm value decreases with firm value.
The coefficient on the index of punitive liability exposure also is
positive, and is significant at the 5 percent level. This result indicates
that the surprise of news about a punitive lawsuit, and therefore the
decrease in firm value, is relatively small for firms in industries that
are subject to frequent punitive lawsuits. Thus, capital markets
appear to take into account a firm’s potential to be sued for punitive
damages in the valuation of the firm’s common stock.
Other than for the constant term, none of the other coefficients
in Model 1 are significantly different from zero. The abnormal
return is not significantly related to the sizes of the compensatory or
punitive awards, nor to the specific content of the announcement.
The coefficient for defense verdicts is positive, and for plaintiff
verdicts is negative, but neither is significantly different from zero.
Nor are the two coefficients significantly different from each other.
We conducted additional tests to examine the sensitivity of
these results to alternate specifications, and also to examine the
influence of several additional explanatory variables. In Model 2, we
                                                 
23 The median change in the market value of equity also is more negative for large
firms than for small firms, reflecting the larger base from which the changes are
calculated.
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introduce two dummy variables that account for the nature of any
personal injury or death involved in the lawsuit. Neither of these
dummy variables is significantly related to the abnormal return,
indicating that the lawsuits in which a victim suffered injury or death
are not, on average, associated with unusually large market value
losses to the defendant firm. In Model 3, we combine the
compensatory and punitive awards into a single regressor. The total
award, however, is not significantly related to the standardized
abnormal return. In Model 4 we examine the effect of our second
index of a firm’s exposure to punitive award liability. This variable
also is not significantly related to the abnormal return.
In summary, we find that the announcement period abnormal
return increases with firm size, and also somewhat with our first
index of the firm’s exposure to punitive-seeking lawsuits. (Still must
test to see whether this relationship holds for other specifications of
firm size.) None of our attempts to explain the cross-section of
abnormal returns is very successful, however. The adjusted R2 values,
for example, are no higher than 0.051. We conclude that, like the
punitive awards themselves, the changes in firms’ values in response
to initial publicity about the lawsuits are not easily explainable.
IX. Conclusion
As Polinsky (1997) suspected, punitive damages appear to be
quite random, but most of our tests indicate that these awards are
only of concern to firms currently facing lawsuits and even here the
evidence is weak. Randomness appears to be relatively greater for
when punitive awards will be imposed rather than for the level of
punitive awards given that they are imposed. Whether one examines
the actual awards for the entire set of punitive damages or the
changes in market value, only a very small portion of the variation
across firms can be explained. We do not find support for the notion
that settlements represent bigger losses to firms than court verdicts.
We find little significant evidence that punitive awards have
large detrimental impacts on the economy nor do we find that the
attempts to restrict punitive awards are viewed as particularly
important. Recent Supreme Court decisions limiting punitive
damages appear to be particularly ineffective, though recent
congressional actions provide evidence of impacts for firms facing
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suits. Abnormal market return tests of punitive lawsuits indicates
that initial press coverage corresponds to statistically significant
decreases defendant companies’ values, indicating that punitive
lawsuits are important to defendants. Overall, no real significant
evidence exists that settlements affect firms differently than verdicts
and different approaches of measuring these impacts imply that
these insignificant estimates vary in sign. Evidence on actual
settlements and verdict awards indicates that settlements are smaller,
while the initial press announcements show that abnormal returns
from settlements are larger. Our results imply a positive, though
uncertain, relationship between firm size and the threat faced from
punitive awards. The result appears sensitive to how firm size is
measured and different event dates yield inconsistent results.
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Table 1
Description of the Punitive Award Lawsuit Sample, 1985-1996
Panel A reports the number of lawsuits seeking punitive damage awards from publicly traded defendant corporations, January 1985 - June
1996, grouped by year and lawsuit type. Cases were identified through the Lexis/Nexis database. To be included in the sample, the defendant
firm must be listed on the 1996 Center for the Study of Security Prices (CRSP) or 1996 Compustat databases. Panel B reports on the subset
of lawsuits for which data are available only from the 1996 CRSP database. Panel C reports on the subset of lawsuits for which data are
available on the 1996 CRSP database that received press coverage, as reported on Lexis/Nexis. The verdicts for all lawsuits in the sample were
handed down between 1985 and 1995, although the initial press announcements for several lawsuits occurred before 1985. Miscellaneous
claims include allegations of wrongful death, premises liability, liability for vehicular accidents, trademark violations, libel, toxic exposure, and
civil rights violations.
Fraud
Business
negligence
Breach of
contract
Product
liability
Insurance
claims
Asbestos
claims
Employment
claims
Vehicular
accidents
Malpractice
claims
Misc.
claims Total
Panel A: Total sample
1985 11 3 9 18 23 0 22 6 5 26 123
1986 12 9 18 12 20 2 19 7 2 21 122
1987 12 23 15 26 35 10 20 6 3 35 185
1988 7 13 13 20 19 2 20 12 2 25 133
1989 18 17 15 28 29 11 15 10 1 35 179
1990 16 25 14 50 41 2 18 17 2 29 214
1991 9 48 12 39 45 6 18 12 1 38 228
1992 10 44 15 47 31 7 19 8 5 24 210
1993 11 35 13 46 27 16 23 11 3 38 223
1994 6 32 18 37 21 1 22 6 1 19 163
1995 6 31 5 33 18 2 23 11 0 23 152
1996 0 11 0 18 5 0 3 4 1 5 47
Total 118 291 147 374 314 59 222 110 26 318 1979
Panel B: Subsample in which defendant has data available on the 1996 CRSP tapes
Total 67 185 80 255 221 31 150 60 18 182 1249
Panel C Event study subsample—events that received press attention
Total 20 62 24 81 42 14 48 10 0 50 351
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Table 2
Summary of Award Amounts
Summary statistics on compensatory, punitive, and total amounts awarded in 1,979 lawsuits in which plaintiffs sought punitive damage awards
from defendants that are publicly traded corporations. Verdicts were rendered or settlements made between 1985 and 1996. The lawsuits are
grouped in columns by outcome (defense verdict, plaintiff verdict, or settlement) and in rows by the lawsuit topic. In each cell, the top number is
the mean punitive, compensatory, or total award for lawsuits in the cell. The number in parentheses is the median award, the number in square
brackets is the maximum, and the number at the bottom is the standard deviation. Positive award amounts for defense verdicts represent payments
agreed to after the verdict. All amounts are in millions of dollars.
Defense verdicts Plaintiff verdicts Settlements All lawsuits
Lawsuit type: Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total
Frauds n=29 n=86 n=3 n=118
0.020 0.000 0.020 5.301 14.811 20.287 1.157 2.500 3.657 3.886 10.858 14.837
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.130) (0.540) (0.900) (0.000) (0.900) (0.070) (0.000) (0.262)
[0.294] [0.000] [0.294] [154.160] [250.000] [404.160] [2.250] [7.500] [9.750] [154.160] [250.000] [404.160]
.076 0.000 .076 20.437 42.989 60.114 0.990 4.330 5.285 17.547 37.221 51.935
Business
negligence n=6 n=280 n=5 n = 291
0.138 0.001 0.139 2.096 20.693 22.861 1.629 0.000 1.629 2.047 19.910 22.025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.300) (0.525) (2.055) (0.000) (2.055) (0.151) (.300) (.523)
[0.830] [0.005] [0.835] [287.000] [5,000.000] [5,287.000] [2.600] [0.000] [2.600] [287.000] [5,000.000] [5,287.000]
0.339 0.002 0.341 17.449 298.763 316.486 1.124 0.000 1.124 17.117 293.069 310.433
Breach of
contract n=35 n=108 n=4 n = 147
0.000 0.000 0.000 7.837 9.550 17.567 1.381 0.000 1.381 5.797 7.016 12.960
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.394) (0.000) (0.912) (0.685) (0.000) (0.685) (0.117) (0.000) (0.253)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [130.000] [400.000] [500.000] [3.353] [0.000] [3.353] [130.000] [400.000] [500.000]
0.000 0.000 0.000 23.190 41.564 55.859 1.733 0.000 1.733 20.165 35.833 48.485
Product liability n=42 n=310 n=22 n=374
0.000 0.000 0.000 3.734 6.184 9.917 0.765 0.000 0.765 3.140 5.126 8.265
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.059) (0.694) (2.030) (0.430) (0.000) (0.430) (0.652) (0.197) (1.449)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [50.000] [101.000] [150.000] [4.400] [0.000] [4.400] [50.000] [101.000] [150.000]
0.000 0.000 0.000 6.960 14.005 18.224 1.032 0.000 1.032 6.475 12.959 16.993
Insurance claim n=48 n=244 n=22 n=314
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Defense verdicts Plaintiff verdicts Settlements All lawsuits
Lawsuit type: Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.939 3.817 4.804 1.482 0.080 1.495 0.828 2.972 3.836
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.200) (0.100) (0.611) (0.365) (0.000) (0.330) (0.100) (0.000) (0.366)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [25.000] [100.000] [100.432] [19.450] [1.750] [19.450] [25.000] [100.000] [100.432]
0.000 0.000 0.000 2.466 11.473 12.687 4.260 0.373 4.168 2.450 10.233 11.381
Asbestos claims n=14 n=36 n=9 n=59
0.000 0.000 0.000 2.419 2.909 5.328 1.641 0.000 1.641 1.726 1.775 3.501
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.519) (0.000) (1.519) (1.016) (0.000) (1.016) (0.500) (0.000) (0.500)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [8.450] [54.000] [57.370] [3.877] [0.000] [3.877] [8.450] [54.000] [57.370]
0.000 0.000 0.000 2.707 9.474 10.315 1.746 0.000 1.746 2.421 7.497 8.378
Employment
claims n=50 n=168 n=4 n=222
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.852 2.693 3.578 1.045 0.000 1.045 0.662 2.038 2.719
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.100) (0.500) (0.750) (0.000) (0.750) (0.154) (0.000) (0.284)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [9.800] [100.000] [107.750] [2.637] [0.000] [2.637] [9.800] [100.000] [107.750]
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.700 10.880 12.184 1.130 0.000 1.130 1.525 9.528 10.685
Vehicular
accidents n=3 n=98 n=9 n=110
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.991 2.015 2.304 0.000 2.304 1.063 .883 1.979
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.376) (0.015) (0.545) (2.797) (0.000) (2.797) (0.338) (0.010) (0.523)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [13.700] [22.500] [25.000] [5.500] [0.000] [5.500] [13.700] [22.500] [25.000]
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.750 2.938 3.919 2.025 0.000 2.025 1.780 2.789 3.761
Malpractice claims n=6 n=20 n=0 n=26
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.728 1.625 2.353 0.560 1.250 1.810
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.027) (0.133) (.015) (0.000) (0.067)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [5.900] [24.000] [25.250] [5.900] [24.000] [25.250]
0.000 0.000 0.000 1.681 5.331 5.757 1.499 4.700 5.120
Misc. claims n=57 n=245 n=16 n=318
0.000 0.000 0.000 3.890 3.419 7.376 1.507 0.000 1.507 3.090 2.634 5.765
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.200) (0.040) (0.478) (0.307) (0.000) (0.307) (0.071) (0.000) (0.177)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [416.000] [125.000] [541.000] [8.350] [0.000] [8.350] [416.000] [125.000] [541.000]
0.000 0.000 0.000 27.573 13.320 37.301 2.377 0.000 2.377 24.314 11.774 32.907
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Defense verdicts Plaintiff verdicts Settlements All lawsuits
Lawsuit type: Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total Compen. Punitive Total
All Lawsuit Types
n=290 n=1,595 n=94 n=1,979
mean 0.005 0.000 0.005 2.867 7.819 10.765 1.372 .098 1.460 2.377 6.317 8.749
(median) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.130) (0.770) (.517) (0.000) (.500) (0.196) (0.025) (.478)
[maximum] [0.830] [0.005] [0.835] [416.000] [5,000.000] [5,287.000] [19.450] [7.500] [19.450] [518.536] [5,000.000] [5,287.000]
standard
deviation
0.054 0.000 0.055 15.558 126.423 135.717 2.463 .792 2.609 18.242 113.507 121.940
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Table 3
Determinants of Punitive Award Amounts
Estimates of the relations between the punitive award and characteristics of the lawsuit and the defendant company.  Model 1
is a Tobit regression using data from 1078 cases, including cases in which the punitive and/or compensatory award is zero.
Model 2 is a Tobit regression using data from 807 cases in which the compensatory award is positive.  Model 3 is an ordinary
least squares regression using data from 668 cases in which positive punitive amounts are awarded.  All coefficients except for
the compensatory award and compensatory award squared are in millions.  p-values are in parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Compensatory award 1.78***
(.000)
1.42***
(.000)
1.37***
(.000)
Compensatory award squared (x 10-9) -9.57***
(.000)
-7.22***
(.000)
-0.04
(.980)
Ln of the market value of equity 0.55*
(.071)
0.89***
(.007)
0.98***
(.002)
Index of industry exposure to punitive award liability -0.92
(.978)
-1.30
(.713)
-30.70
(.374)
Number of defendants 0.01
(.987)
0.04
(.956)
1.57**
(.033)
Fixed effects for lawsuit type YES YES YES
Fixed year effects YES YES YES
Fixed state effects YES YES YES
Intercept 12.60**
(.073)
8.79*
(.210)
0.45
(.944)
n 1087 807 668
Chi-squared (F-value for model 3) 446.7 340.7 8.41
p-value .000 .000 .000
Pseudo R2 (adjusted R2 for model 3) .018 .015 .508
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 4
Factors Affecting the Likelihood that Punitive Damages Will be Awarded
Logistic regression estimates in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a positive punitive amount is awarded, and zero
otherwise. Model 1 includes all cases in the sample for which the punitive award amount is reported and data are available on
the firm’s market value of equity. Model 2 includes additional firms without market value of equity data. Models 3 and 4
include only cases in which positive compensatory amounts are awarded. Significance levels are in parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Compensatory award (x 10-7) 2.16***
(.000)
0.82**
(.013)
0.58
(.101)
0.17
(.152)
Compensatory award squared (x 10-16) -26.70***
(.000)
-1.85*
(.000)
-9.22
(.148)
-0.34
(.360)
Ln of the market value of equity -0.05
(.195)
---- -0.02
(.735)
----
Index of industry exposure to punitive award liability 3.30
(.449)
1.53
(.652)
-1.05
(.861)
-1.94
(.680)
Number of defendants -0.12
(.202)
-0.20***
(.004)
-0.18
(.181)
-0.218**
(.026)
Intercept 21.67***
(.000)
19.52***
(.000)
21.26***
(.000)
20.67***
(.000)
Fixed effects for lawsuit type YES YES YES YES
Fixed year effects YES YES YES YES
Fixed state effects YES YES YES YES
n 953 1497 636 1058
Pseudo R2 .220 .203 .183 .192
Model Chi-squared 287 411 135 221
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two- tailed test.
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Table 5
Information on Important U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Punitive Damage Awards, 1985-1996
U.S. Supreme Court dates
Title Description Lower court outcome Writ Argued Decided Outcome
Aetna Life Insurance
v. Lavoie
Breach of contract $1,650 actual damages
$3.5 million punitive award
NA 12/4/85 4/22/86 Award affirmed
Bankers Life and
Casualty v. Crenshaw
Breach of contract $20,000 actual damages
$1.6 million punitive award
NA 10/30/87 5/16/88 Award affirmed
Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.
Antitrust claim $366,000 (treble) damages and
court costs
$6.066 million punitive award
12/5/88 4/18/89 6/26/89 Award affirmed
Pacific Mutual Life v.
Haslip
Breach of contract $200,000 actual damages
$3.84 million punitive award
4/2/90 10/3/90 3/4/91 Award affirmed
TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.
Title dispute $19,000 actual damages
$10 million punitive award
11/30/92 3/31/93 6/25/93 Award affirmed
Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg
Product liability $900,000 actual damages
$5 million punitive award
1/14/94 4/20/94 6/24/94 Reversed and
remanded
BMW of North
America v. Gore
Consumer fraud $4,000 actual damages
$2 million punitive award
1/23/95 10/11/95 5/20/96 Reversed
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Table 6
Market-wide Stock Returns around Important U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Aggregate equal-weighted market returns around key U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding punitive damage awards, 1985-
1996. Test statistics, in parentheses, are distributed approximately as unit normal under the null hypothesis of no abnormal
returns. Each test statistic is computed as the cumulative aggregate return minus the expected return, divided by an estimate of
the standard error of the cumulative return. The expected return and standard error are estimated from stock returns during the
200 trading days immediately preceding the event period.
Cumulative aggregate returns around the following dates:
Petition for writ of certiorari granted Arguments heard Decision rendered
(-1, +1) (-1, +10) (-1, +1) (-1, +10) (-1, +1) (-1, +10)
Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie NA NA 0.316
(0.23)
1.766
(0.81)
0.194
(-0.18)
0.979
(-0.20)
Bankers Life and Casualty v.
Crenshaw
NA NA 3.797**
(2.06)
4.695
(1.14)
0.164
(-0.10)
1.573
(0.04)
Browning Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc.
0.392
(0.11)
3.060
(0.62)
0.413
(0.09)
1.943
(0.26)
0.749
(-1.293)
1.344
(-0.067)
Pacific Mutual Life v. Haslip 1.045**
(-2.00)
1.532**
(-1.99)
-2.353***
(-2.69)
-2.785*
(-1.75)
2.192*
(1.83)
6.199**
(2.50)
TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.
1.456
(1.08)
4.581
(1.44)
0.700
(-1.50)
0.692
(-1.02)
0.912
(0.34)
2.170
(-0.25)
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg 0.489
(-0.20)
0.907
(-1.14)
0.650
(0.07)
1.830
(-0.36)
-0.407
(-1.18)
0.866
(-0.76)
BMW of North America v.
Gore
0.168
(-0.96)
2.265
(0.42)
0.757
(1.91)
0.642
(0.50)
1.413**
(1.75)
3.136*
(1.94)
Average, cases 1 – 5 0.268 2.036 -0.295 1.262 0.543 2.453
t-statistic (-0.47) (0.04) (-0.81) (-0.25) (0.27) (0.91)
Average, cases 6 - 7 0.161 1.586 0.704 1.236 0.503 2.001*
t-statistic (-0.79) (-0.57) (1.26) (0.60) (0.44) (1.92)
*, *, and *** indicate that the abnormal return is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7
Mean Abnormal Stock Returns for Firms with Recent, Current, or Pending Punitive Awards Cases
Mean three-day abnormal stock returns for defendant companies in lawsuits seeking punitive awards that occur within 365
calendar days of U.S. Supreme Court actions concerning seven cases with important implications for punitive awards. Each cell
presents the number of firms with lawsuits settled within 365 days of the Supreme Court action, the mean abnormal stock
return (in %) for the three days centered on the day of the Court action, and (in parentheses) the associated t-statistic.
Petition for writ of certiorari granted Arguments heard Decision rendered
Aetna Life Insurance v. Lavoie NA n=127
-0.15
(-0.64)
n=148
-1.56
(-5.61)
Bankers Life and Casualty v.
Crenshaw
NA n=189
-3.36
(-7.76)
n=195
0.05
(0.22)
Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc.
n=185
-0.27
(-1.36)
n=185
0.35
(1.42)
n=200
0.18
(0.83)
Pacific Mutual Life v.
Haslip
n=260
0.04
(0.22)
n=258
-1.53
(-4.79)
n=253
-0.27
(0.41)
TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.
n=256
0.89
(3.76)
n=261
-0.18
(-0.62)
n=272
1.05
(5.55)
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg n=282
-0.35
(-1.87)
n=276
0.37
(1.57)
n=263
0.24
(1.48)
BMW of North America v. Gore n=240
-0.27
(-1.52)
n=163
0.29
(1.43)
n=108
0.18
(0.93)
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Table 8
Cross-sectional Determinants of Stock Price Reactions to Important U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
Estimated coefficients from regressions using the firm-specific three-day abnormal stock return as the dependent variable. In
Panel A, abnormal stock returns are measured over the three trading days centered on May 20, 1996, the day the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the BMW case. In Panel B, abnormal stock returns are measured over the three trading days
centered on June 24, 1994, the day the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Honda Motors case. In each panel,
observations are included only for firms that are defendants in punitive award cases within 365 calendar days, before or after, the
date of the Supreme Court action. The regressors include the compensatory award divided by the firm’s market value of equity,
the punitive award divided by the firm’s market value of equity, the natural log of the firm’s market value of equity, and indices
of the firm’s exposure to punitive award liability. Index #1 reflects the relative frequency of punitive award lawsuits for firms in
the same industry during the three-year period centered on the current year. Index #2 is index #1 multiplied by the average
punitive award in those same lawsuits. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Exposure to punitive award liability:
Regression
number
Compensatory
award
Punitive
award
Ln(MVE) Index #1 Index #2 Index #1x
ln(MVE)
Index #2x
ln(MVE)
n Adj. R-
squared
F-statistic
(x 10-5) (x 10-5) (x 10-4) (x 10-1) (x 10-9) (x 10-3) (x 10-11)
Panel A: Effects of BMW of North America v. Gore on values of firms with nearby punitive damage awards cases
1 5.29***
(4.67)
7.58***
(3.43)
4.94**
(2.59)
-3.17**
(-2.48)
106 .292 11.85***
2 -5.58
(-1.18)
7.41***
(3.00)
8.51***
(4.43)
-5.47***
(-4.23)
106 .151 5.68***
3 6.53***
(6.10)
3.90**
2.24
-1.52
(-0.50)
9.14
(0.50)
106 .244 9.46***
4 -5.40
(-1.04)
7.07
(0.04)
-1.79
(-0.51)
10.82
(0.51)
106 -.024 0.39
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Panel B: Effects of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg on values of firms with nearby punitive damage awards cases.
1 -6.96***
(-5.15)
-3.71
(-1.17)
1.03
(0.54)
-5.39
(-0.41)
262 .094 7.74***
2 -6.84
(-6.01)
-4.77
(-1.52)
0.18
(0.10)
0.33
(0.03)
262 .123 10.18***
3 -7.07
(-5.27)***
-4.00
(-1.77)*
-0.81
(-0.41)
0.40
(0.33)
262 .089 7.39***
4 -7.02***
(-6.27)
-4.53**
(-2.05)
-2.47
(-1.26)
1.41
(1.18)
262 .125 10.29***
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Table 9
Stock Returns around Key Dates in the History of Punitive Award Reform Legislation
Three-day stock returns and abnormal stock returns centered on each of eight dates in the development of punitive award
legislation during 1995 and 1996. The third column reports the cumulative equal weighted CRSP index return for the three
days centered on the reported date. The far right column reports average abnormal three-day stock return for companies that
are defendants in unresolved punitive award lawsuits on the date of the legislative development. Because our sample of firms
ends in June 1996, the sample size of pending lawsuits declines over time, from 125 for the first date to 8 for the last date. t-
statistics are in parentheses. For the index return, each test statistic is computed as the cumulative aggregate return minus the
expected return, divided by an estimate of the standard error of the cumulative return. The expected return and standard error
are estimated from stock returns during the 200 trading days immediately preceding the event period. For the firms with
pending lawsuits, abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated using estimates from a one-factor market model.
Date Description of event
CRSP equal-weighted index
return (%)
Average abnormal stock
return for firms with pending
adverse punitive awards (%)
3/10/95 House passes HR 988 (imposing costs in some circumstances
on parties who refuse settlements); House passes HR 956
(capping damage awards)
0.94
(1.00)
0.63***
(2.97)
3/16/95 Headline on article when bills arrive in Senate: “House legal
bill called all but dead in Senate”
0.84
(0.85)
-1.04***
(-5.37)
5/10/95 Watered-down curb on punitive awards passed in Senate 0.64
(0.45)
0.88***
(2.95)
3/18/96 Press attention for product liability bill approved by House-
Senate conference committee
1.24
(0.90)
1.17***
(3.12)
3/21/96 Bill passes in Senate 59-40, “. . . not strong enough to
override a veto.”
0.75
(0.31)
-0.61*
(-1.86)
3/29/96 Bill passes in House 259-158, “. . . not strong enough to
override a veto.”
1.15
(0.81)
-0.89***
(-4.74)
5/2/96 “Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act” vetoed
by President Clinton
0.57
(0.11)
-0.77
(-1.56)
5/9/96 House fails to override veto by 23 votes 1.38
(1.12)
1.39***
(3.00)
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 10
Cross-sectional Determinants of Stock Price Reactions
to Key Developments in Punitive Award Legislation
Estimated coefficients from ordinary least squares regressions using the firm-specific three-day abnormal stock return as the
dependent variable. In Panel A, abnormal stock returns are measured over the three trading days centered on March 10, 1995,
the day the U.S. House passed two bills that would discourage large punitive awards. In Panel B, abnormal stock returns are
measured over the three trading days centered on March 16, 1995, the day leading U.S. Senators declared that passage in the
Senate was unlikely. In Panel C, abnormal stock returns are measured over the three trading days centered on May 10, 1995, the
day a weaker form of punitive award reform legislation was passed in the U.S. Senate. In each panel, observations are included
only for firms that are defendants in unresolved punitive award lawsuits. The regressors include the compensatory award divided
by the firm’s market value of equity, the punitive award divided by the firm’s market value of equity, the natural log of the firm’s
market value of equity, and an index of the firm’s exposure to punitive award liability (which reflects the relative frequency of
punitive award lawsuits for firms in the same industry during the three-year period centered on the current year). t-statistics are
in parentheses.
Compensatory
award (x 10-4)
Ln(MVE) Index #1 of exposure to
punitives  (x 10-2)
Index #1
x ln(MVE)
n Adj. R-squared F-statistic
Panel A:  Effects of U.S. House of Representatives passage of anti-punitive award legislation
-0.92**
(-1.97)
2.47***
(2.79)
10.98**
(2.59)
-0.68
(-1.31)
119 .094 4.05***
Panel B:  Effects of publicity that passage of the legislation in the U.S. Senate was unlikely
-5.27
(-1.23)
0.84
(1.03)
14.95**
(2.12)
-0.92*
(-1.94)
119 .021 1.65
Panel C:  Effects of U.S. Senate passage of weaker anti-punitive award reform legislation
-20.85***
(-3.35)
0.52**
(0.43)
40.81
(3.89)
-2.45
(-3.49)
107 .120 7.61***
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 11
The Relation between Stock Returns and Exposure to Punitive Award Liability around Key
Supreme Court Decisions and Dates in the History of Punitive Award Reform Legislation
Results from ordinary least squares regressions using cross-sectional data for each of several dates regarding actual or proposed changes in the
legal environment. In each regression, the dependend variable is the three-day abnormal stock return centered on date in question. The
independent variables are the natural log of the market value of common stock, and the coefficient for the index (#1) of industry-related
punitive award liability. Data on all firms listed in the 1996 CRSP tapes are used in each regression, subject to firm-specific data availability
to estimate the firm’s abnormal stock return. The coefficients on the index of liability exposure are reported, along with the associated t-
statistics (in parentheses).
Date Description of event
Coefficient for index of industry-related
punitive liability exposure (t-statistic)
F-statistic (Sample
size)
Panel A: Two important U.S. Supreme Court decisions
6/24/94 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg decision rendered 0.086
(0.93)
0.52
(n = 7203)
5/20/96 BMW of North America v. Gore decision rendered 0.153
(0.88)
28.58
(n = 8184)
Panel B: Important legislation or pending legislation announcement dates
3/10/95 House passes HR 988 (imposing costs in some
circumstances on parties who refuse settlements);
-0.060
(-0.36)
0.56
(n = 7802)
3/16/95 Headline on article when bills arrive in Senate: “House
legal bill called all but dead in Senate”
0.083
(0.54)
27.48
(n = 7806)
5/10/95 Watered-down curb on punitive awards passed in Senate 0.096
(0.59)
27.33
(n = 7638)
3/18/96 Press attention for product liability bill approved by
House-Senate conference committee
0.292
(1.76)*
4.09
(n = 7888)
3/21/96 Bill passes in Senate 59-40, “. . . not strong enough to
override a veto.”
-0.014
(-0.09)
30.95
(n = 8066)
3/29/96 Bill passes in House 259-158, “. . . not strong 0.105
(0.73)
5.05
(n = 8079)
5/2/96 “Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act”
vetoed by President Clinton
-0.111
(-0.59)
65.67
(n = 8113)
5/9/96 House fails to override veto by 23 votes 0.119
(0.82)
5.33
(n = 8018)
* denotes significance at the 0.10 level for the coefficient, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 12
Average Abnormal Stock Returns upon
Press Announcements of Punitive Lawsuits
Average abnormal stock returns associated with 351 press announcements pertaining to lawsuits in which punitive damages
were sought or awarded, involving 235 different defendant firms between 1979 and 1995.  Each cell reports the mean and two-
day abnormal return, the associated t-statistic (in parentheses), the z-statistic for the generalized sign test based on the
proportion of positive abnormal returns [in brackets], and the number of announcements in that category.  Superscripts indicate
the significance levels associated with the t-tests and generalized sign tests.  Events are grouped by announcement type and
according to whether the announcement was the initial or a subsequent press announcement about the lawsuit.  Abnormal
returns are measured relative to a benchmark determined by a one-factor market model using the CRSP equal-weighted index.
Type of press announcement Initial announcements Subsequent announcements
Pre-verdict news -1.02%
(-2.86)**
[-1.98]**
n=80
0.49%
(0.38)
[0.82]
n=10
Verdict or settlement news:
Defense verdict -0.36%
(-0.51)
[-1.12]
n=15
-0.44%
(-0.44)
[-0.58]
n=3
Settlement -2.43%
(-1.35)
[-0.13]
n=4
--
--
--
n=0
Plaintiff verdict -0.62%
(-2.74)***
[-1.94]*
n=193
-1.36%
(-2.37)**
[-1.60]
 n=47
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Type of press announcement Initial announcements Subsequent announcements
Post-verdict news:
Neutral news 0.62%
(1.35)
[1.38]
n=25
0.17%
(0.26)
[-0.15]
n=11
Post-verdict news favorable to the
defendant firm
1.29%
(1.93)*
[0.47]
n=18
0.36%
(0.80)
[-0.56]
n=39
Post verdict news unfavorable to
the defendant firm
0.11%
(-0.16)
[-0.25]
n=16
0.06%
(-0.14)
[-1.23]
n=25
All announcements -0.45%
(-2.70)***
[-1.91]*
n=351
-0.33%
(-1.15)
[-1.18]
n=135
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed
test.
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Table 13
Changes in the Market Value of Equity
Summary statistics on the two-day abnormal changes in common stock market values associated with 351 initial press
announcements between 1979 and 1995 pertaining to lawsuits in which punitive damages were sought or awarded from 235
defendant firms. The events are categorized by the timing of the initial press announcement relative to the verdict or
settlement. The abnormal stock value changes are calculated as the two-day abnormal stock return times the market value of
the firm’s common stock measured ten calendar days before the press announcement. The abnormal stock return is measured
relative to a benchmark determined by a one-factor market model using the CRSP equal-weighted index. All numbers
represent millions of dollars ($ millions).
Type of press announcement Minimum 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Maximum
Pre-verdict news (sample size = 80) -2019.1 -39.4 -2.4 13.5 1317.9
Verdict or settlement:
Defense verdict (sample size = 14) -240.6 -40.3 -1.1 116.1 379.1
Settlement (sample size = 4) -44.2 -32.7 -1.9 444.6 871.9
Plaintiff verdict (sample size = 193) -1554.2 -77.9 -8.5 18.9 1802.3
Post-verdict news:
Neutral news (sample size = 25) -580.8 22.1 3.2 68.2 292.2
Favorable news (sample size = 18) -426.2 -81.6 3.4 39.7 669.3
Unfavorable news (sample size = 16) -371.5 -49.8 -4.0 19.1 313.1
All announcements -2019.1 -62.0 -2.9 23.9 1802.3
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Table 14
Comparison of the Award Amounts to the Loss in Firm Value
Summary statistics on loss in market value and court-imposed penalties for 242 lawsuits between 1979 and 1995. The loss in
market value is computed as the initial press announcement two-day abnormal stock return times the firm’s market value of
equity measured 10 calendar days previously. Negative entries indicate that the mean (or median) change in firm value is
positive. Only events for which the initial press article is about a current lawsuit, a verdict, or settlement are included. To
eliminate extreme outliers, cases for which the absolute value of the ratio of the total award to the loss in market value exceeds
2.0 are excluded. All amounts, other than the ratios in the right-hand column, are in millions of dollars.
Type of lawsuit
Loss in
equity value
Total award
or settlement
Difference between
loss and total award
Total award divided by
the loss in equity value
Fraud
(n = 14)
Mean
median
192.6
24.1
27.0
7.2
165.5
8.1
.35
.17
Business negligence
(n = 44)
Mean
median
53.6
22.9
6.0
1.5
47.5
22.1
-.09
.00
Breach of contract
(n = 15)
Mean
median
-48.0
1.3
15.5
5.2
-63.5
-2.0
-.69
.03
Products liability
(n = 54)
Mean
median
-79.0
1.7
17.1
11.6
-96.1
-2.9
.29
.00
Insurance claims
(n = 26)
Mean
median
40.3
15.2
11.4
5.7
28.9
3.3
.08
.01
Asbestos claims
(n = 13)
Mean
median
-20.0
-14.8
5.5
2.5
-25.5
-16.6
-.30
-.11
Employment claims
(n = 36)
Mean
median
21.3
19.6
8.8
1.3
12.6
16.2
.12
.01
Vehicular accident claims
(n = 7)
Mean
median
8.2
6.7
4.0
0.9
3.5
5.8
.38
.13
Miscellaneous claims
(n = 33)
Mean
median
-0.4
10.4
13.2
4.5
-13.6
0.9
.80
.03
Totals - All lawsuits
(n = 231)
Mean
median
6.9
9.6
12.2
3.9
-5.3
2.0
.16
.01
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Table 15
Determinants of the Defendant Firms’ Announcement Period Abnormal Returns
Ordinary least squares estimates of the relations between abnormal returns associated with 287 initial announcements of
punitive award lawsuits and characteristics of the lawsuit and defendant company. This table reports results only for cases in
which the first news article reports news of a current lawsuit, verdict, or settlement. The dependent variable is the two-day
announcement period abnormal stock return divided by its standard error. Independent variables include the natural log of the
market value of firm equity, indices for the firm’s exposure to punitive award liability, the compensatory and punitive amounts
awarded, and dummy variables for the type of news about the lawsuit. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ln of the market value of equity
(in %)
2.77
(4.08)***
2.86
(4.17)***
2.24
(3.49)***
2.74
(3.98)***
Indices for industry-exposure to punitive award
liability:
Index 1
(based on relative frequencies of cases)
1.38
(1.97)**
1.25
(1.75)*
1.28
(1.80)*
Index 2 (based on relative frequencies of cases and
award amounts) (x 10-9)
2.89
(0.31)
Compensatory award divided by the market value
of equity (x 10-4)
3.78
(1.55)
3.79
(1.56)
3.70
(1.51)
Punitive award divided by the market value of
equity (x 10-4)
-0.64
(-0.70)
-0.64
(-0.70)
-0.67
(-0.74)
Total award divided by the market value of equity
(x 10-4)
-1.74
(-1.00)
Dummy variable for defense verdict announcement
(in %)
2.99
(0.52)
3.71
(0.64)
3.43
(0.58)
2.97
(0.51)
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Dummy variable for settlement announcement (in
%)
9.00
(1.29)
8.67
(1.23)
9.46
(1.32)
8.53
(1.21)
Dummy variable for plaintiff verdict
announcement (in %)
-1.34
(-0.50)
-1.11
(-0.41)
0.00
(0.00)
-1.10
(-0.41)
Dummy variable for death involved
(in %)
1.76
(0.52)
Dummy variable for non-death injury involved
(in %)
-2.16
(-0.75)
Intercept -0.47
(-4.60)***
-0.48
(-4.65)***
-0.39
(-4.11)***
-0.44
(-4.34)***
F-value 3.21 2.61 2.96 2.63
p-value [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012]
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.048 0.042 0.038
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
